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Abstract
Languages such as C and C++ use unsafe manual memory
management, allowing simple bugs (i.e., accesses to an
object after deallocation) to become the root cause of
exploitable security vulnerabilities. This paper proposes
Watchdog, a hardware-based approach for ensuring safe
and secure manual memory management. Inspired by prior
software-only proposals, Watchdog generates a unique
identifier for each memory allocation, associates these
identifiers with pointers, and checks to ensure that the
identifier is still valid on every memory access. This use of
identifiers and checks enables Watchdog to detect errors
even in the presence of reallocations. Watchdog stores these
pointer identifiers in a disjoint shadow space to provide
comprehensive protection and ensure compatibility with
existing code. To streamline the implementation and reduce
runtime overhead: Watchdog (1) uses micro-ops to access
metadata and perform checks, (2) eliminates metadata
copies among registers via modified register renaming, and
(3) uses a dedicated metadata cache to reduce checking
overhead. Furthermore, this paper extends Watchdog’s
mechanisms to detect bounds errors, thereby providing full
hardware-enforced memory safety at low overheads.
1. Introduction
Languages such as C and C++ are the gold standard for
implementing low-level systems software such as operat-
ing systems, virtual machine monitors, language runtimes,
embedded software, and performance critical software of all
kinds. Although safer languages exist (and are widely used
in some domains), these low-level languages persist partly
because they provide low-level control over memory layout
and use explicit manual memory management (e.g., malloc
and free). Unfortunately, the unsafe attributes of these lan-
guages result in nefarious bugs that cause memory corrup-
tion, program crashes, and serious security vulnerabilities.
This paper focuses primarily on eliminating memory cor-
ruption and security vulnerabilities caused by one specific
aspect of low-level languages: memory deallocation errors,
which directly result in dangling pointer dereference bugs
This research was funded in part by the U.S. Government. The views and conclusions
contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as
representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Government.
This research was funded in part by DARPA contract HR0011-10-9-0008, ONR award
N000141110596, and NSF grants CNS-1116682, CCF-1065166, and CCF-0810947.
int *p, *q, *r;
p = malloc(8);
...
q = p;
...
free(p);
r = malloc(8);
...
... = *q;
int* q;
void foo() {
  int a;
  q = &a;
}
int main() {
  foo();
  ... = *q;
}
Heap based Stack based
Figure 1. Dangling pointer errors involving the heap and
stack. On the left, freeing p causes q to become a dangling
pointer. The memory pointed to by q could be reallocated
by any subsequent call to malloc(). On the right, foo()
assigns the address of stack-allocated variable a to global
variable q. After foo() returns, its stack frame is popped,
and q points to a stale region of the stack, which any inter-
vening function call could alter. In both cases, dereferencing
q can result in garbage values or data corruption.
and use-after-free (UAF) security vulnerabilities. In essence,
we seek to enforce safe manual memory management and
thereby eliminate an entire class of security vulnerabilities
and uncaught memory corruption bugs. Figure 1 shows two
use-after-free errors, including a dangling reference to a re-
allocated heap location (left) and a dangling pointer to the
stack (right).
Use-after-free (UAF) errors have proven to be just as
severe and exploitable as buffer overflow errors: they too po-
tentially allow an attacker to corrupt values in memory [6],
inject malicious code, and initiate return-to-libc attacks [31].
Use-after-free vulnerabilities have been used in real-world
attacks, and many such vulnerabilities in mainstream
software include CVE-2010-0249 in Microsoft’s Internet
Explorer, CVE-2009-1690 in Apple’s Safari and Google’s
Chrome browsers, and CVE-2011-2373 in Mozilla’s Fire-
fox browser. The number of use-after-free vulnerabilities
reported has been increasing in recent years, in contrast with
the decline in buffer overflow vulnerabilities reported [1].
The fundamental cause of use-after-free vulnerabilities
is that programming languages providing manual memory
management (such as C/C++) do not ensure that program-
mers use those features safely. Unfortunately, the commonly
advocated alternative — developing software in garbage-
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collected languages — is not always easily applicable in all
domains (such as for operating systems or high-performance
real-time code) where real-time response or low-level con-
trol over memory is required. Porting legacy code to these
safer languages is not always cost effective, and using con-
servative garbage collection [4] is not always feasible due
to pause times and observed memory leaks in long-running
software [32].
Given their importance, there has been increased effort
in detecting these use-after-free errors, but significant chal-
lenges remain. One approach is to randomize the location of
heap objects [19, 28] to probabilistically transform dangling
pointer dereferences into hard-to-exploit non-deterministic
errors. Although useful for mitigating some use-after-free
exploits, such approaches fail to detect use-after-free errors
on the stack and suffer from locality-destroying memory
fragmentation. Other approaches seek to detect errors
by tracking the allocation/deallocation status of regions
of memory (via shadow space in software [26], with
hardware [5, 34], or page-granularity tracking via virtual
memory mechanisms [10, 20]). Alternative approaches
track and check unique identifiers either completely with
software [3, 23, 29, 35] or with hardware acceleration [7]. In
general, prior approaches generally suffer from one or more
of the following issues: failure to detect all use-after-free
errors (due to reallocation of memory), incompatibilities
(due to memory layout changes), require significant changes
to the tool chain, high memory overheads, or high perfor-
mance overheads. Such overheads typically limit the use of
software-only approaches to only debugging contexts rather
than being used all the time in deployed code. Given that
manual memory management in low-level languages like
C is still ubiquitous, we seek a highly compatible means of
eliminating use-after-free vulnerabilities completely with
low enough overheads to be used all the time.
This paper proposes Watchdog, a hardware proposal that
enforces safe and secure manual memory management even
in the presence of reallocations. Watchdog builds upon prior
proposals for identifier-based use-after-free checking [3, 7,
23, 29, 35] using disjoint metadata [23]. TheWatchdog hard-
ware performs the majority of the work, relying on the soft-
ware runtime to inform it about memory allocations and
deallocations. Watchdog associates a unique identifier with
every memory allocation, and it marks the identifier as in-
valid on memory deallocations. Every pointer has an associ-
ated identifier that is propagated on pointer operations. For
pointers resident in memory, these identifiers are maintained
in a disjoint metadata space. Watchdog performs use-after-
free checks to ascertain that the identifier associated with the
pointer is still valid before every memory access. As identi-
fiers are never reused (they are 64-bit unique values), Watch-
dog detects all use-after-free errors even in the presence of
reallocations.
The Watchdog hardware employs several optimizations
to reduce the performance penalties of identifier-based
checking. First, Watchdog uses micro-op (µop) injection [8]
to perform metadata propagation and checking. Second,
Watchdog uses an identifier metadata encoding that reduces
the validity check to a single load-and-compare µop.
Third, Watchdog identifies memory operations that load
or store pointers conservatively in unmodified binaries (by
assuming any 64-bit integer may contain a pointer) or more
precisely using ISA-assisted identification, which allows the
compiler to annotate loads and stores of pointers. Fourth,
the hardware uses copy elimination via register remapping
to eliminate metadata copies within the core. Performance
measurements of a simulated x86 processor on twenty
benchmarks indicate that the runtime overhead is 15% on
an average for detecting all use-after-free errors.
Furthermore, this paper shows that the basic mechanisms
in Watchdog are easily extended to include pointer-based
bounds checking in hardware [9], further supporting the ap-
plicability and utility of the approach. Many of the same op-
timizations apply directly, resulting in a system with 24%
average performance overhead that enforces full memory
safety and thus provides comprehensive prevention of all
use-after-free and buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
2. Background
This section provides background on techniques for de-
tecting use-after-free errors that are most closely related to
Watchdog; other approaches are discussed in Section 10.
Although a long standing problem, there are no hardware
proposals that detect all use-after-free errors (i.e., even in
the presence of reallocations) while maintaining memory
layout compatibility with existing code.
Existing use-after-free checking approaches can be
broadly classified into two categories based on the track-
ing and checking scheme used: (1) location based and
(2) identifier based. As described in the subsections below,
location-based approaches fail to detect use-after-free errors
to re-allocated memory, and thus lack the comprehensive de-
tection provided by identifier-based approaches. In contrast,
identifier-based approaches typically use inline metadata,
which introduces incompatibilities due to memory layout
changes. Watchdog is the first hardware implementation of
identifier-based checking with disjoint metadata, allowing
it to avoid the incompatibility of inline metadata while
retaining comprehensiveness.
2.1 Location-Based Checking
Location-based approaches (e.g., [17, 25, 34]) use the loca-
tion (address) of the object to determine whether it is allo-
cated or not. An auxiliary data structure records the allocat-
ed/deallocated status of each location, and it is updated on
memory allocations (e.g. malloc()) and deallocations (e.g.
free()). On each memory access, these auxiliary structures
are consulted to determine whether the dereferenced address
is currently valid (allocated) memory. Common implemen-
tations of these object-location based approaches use either
a splay tree [11, 17] or a shadow space [2, 25, 34] as the
auxiliary data structure to provide efficient lookups.
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These techniques are good debugging aids and detect
many common errors. However, their inability to detect er-
rors in the presence of reallocations fundamentally limits
the efficacy of these approaches. Whenever a location is re-
allocated this approach erroneously allows the dereference
of a dangling pointer reference to proceed. The information
tracked by this approach is insufficient to determine that the
pointer’s original allocation area was freed and is now being
used again for another potentially unrelated purpose.
2.2 Identifier-Based Checking
An alternative approach is the allocation identifier ap-
proach [3, 7, 23, 29, 35], which associates a unique
identifier with each memory allocation. Whenever memory
is deallocated (by a call to free() or popping a call stack
frame), the unique identifier associated with that allocation
is marked as invalid. On a memory access, the system
checks that the unique allocation identifier associated with
pointer used to make the access is still valid. Identifiers are
never reused, and thus any memory access to a deallocated
object will find that the identifier is no longer valid.
The per-allocation identifier must be tracked so that it
can be checked on every memory access. Thus, each pointer
has an associated identifier, and this identifier is propagated
as the pointer is copied or pointer arithmetic is performed.
This metadata is tracked both for pointers in registers and
pointers in memory. In memory, this metadata is typically
maintained inline (i.e., a fat pointer) [3, 7, 29, 35]. Such
inline metadata can introduce code incompatibilities due to
memory layout changes. In addition, arbitrary casts in the
program can corrupt inline metadata resulting in uncaught
errors. To avoid the problems of inline metadata, a recently
proposed software-only identifier-based approach employs
disjoint metadata [23]. The key advantage of identifier based
approaches is the ability to detect all dangling pointer errors.
However, as they require a lookup on every memory access,
they can have significant performance overheads.
2.3 Implementation Approaches and Comparison
Table 1 provides the comparison of various schemes un-
der the common umbrella of location based and identifier
based approaches. Use-after-free checking can be imple-
mented: (1) by source-to-source translation, (2) during com-
pilation, (3) via binary rewriting, (4) completely in hard-
ware, or (5) various hybrids of these approaches. One advan-
tage of source-to-source, compiler-based or hybrid instru-
mentation is that the identity of instructions manipulating
pointers is known. Thus, identifier based approaches, which
maintain identifier information with each pointer, can be
more efficiently implemented on the source code or within
the compiler. In contrast, binary translation and hardware-
based approaches generally do not know a priori which in-
structions manipulate pointers. Hence, such approaches have
primarily used location-based checking, resulting in the in-
ability to detect errors in the presence of reallocations and
thus limiting their effectiveness in preventing security vul-
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Table 1. Comparison of representative location-based and
identifier-based approaches with instrumentation method,
runtime overhead, metadata organization, safety even with
arbitrary type casts, and comprehensive (Compre.) error de-
tection in the presence of memory reallocations.
nerabilities. Chuang et al. [7] proposed a compiler-based
identifier-based checker with hardware acceleration and in-
line metadata. Its inline metadata changes the layout of ob-
jects in memory (which can cause code incompatibilities)
and allows arbitrary type casts to corrupt metadata (which
can compromise comprehensive detection).
3. Watchdog Approach
The goal of Watchdog is to enforce safe and secure manual
memory management by providing comprehensive detec-
tion—detecting all memory management errors even in the
presence of reallocations—and doing so while keeping the
overheads of checking every memory access low enough to
be widely deployed in live systems. To provide comprehen-
sive detection, Watchdog employs identifier-based checking
of use-after-free errors almost entirely in hardware, relying
on the software runtime only to provide information about
memory allocations and deallocations. To localize the hard-
ware changes, this checking is implemented by augmenting
instruction execution by injecting extra µops. Furthermore,
Watchdog aims to provide source compatibility (i.e., few
source code changes) and binary compatibility (i.e., library
interfaces unchanged) by leaving the data layout unchanged
using a disjoint shadow space for metadata.
3.1 Operation Overview
In Watchdog, the hardware is responsible for identifier
propagation and checking. Once the memory allocations are
identified with the help of a modified malloc() and free()
runtime library, a unique identifier is provided to every
memory allocation and associated with the pointer pointing
to the allocated memory. As pointers can be resident in
any register, conceptually Watchdog extends every register
with a sidecar identifier register. Pointers can also reside
in memory, so Watchdog provides a shadow memory that
shadows every word of memory with an identifier for point-
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ld R1 <- memory[R2]
(a) Load
 check R2.id
 R1. id <- shadow[R2.val].id
 R1.val <-memory[R2.val].val
st memory[R2]<- R1
(b) Store
 check R2.id
 shadow[R2.val].id <- R1.id
 memory[R2.val].val <- R1.val
add R1 <- R2, R3
 if (R2. id  != INVALID)
    R1.id <-  R2.id
 else
     R1.id <- R3.id
 R1.val <- R2.val + R3.val
add R1 <- R2,imm
(c) Add immediate
 R1. id <-  R2.id
 R1.val <- R2.val + imm
(d) Add
Figure 2. Identifier (id) metadata checking and propagation through load, store, add immediate and add.
ers. To propagate and check the metadata, Watchdog injects
µops in hardware. On memory deallocations, the identifier
associated with the pointer pointing to the memory being
deallocated is marked as invalid. On every memory access,
Watchdog checks to ascertain if the identifier associated
with the pointer being dereferenced is still valid. Accessing
a memory location with an invalid identifier results in an
exception. The following subsections explain each of these
operations performed by Watchdog.
3.2 Checks on Memory Accesses
The hardware performs identifier validity checking by
inserting a check µop before every memory access. The
check µop uses the sidecar identifier metadata associated
with the pointer register being dereferenced and checks
whether the retrieved identifier is in the set of valid identi-
fiers. A check failure triggers an exception, which can be
handled by the operating system by aborting the program or
by invoking some user-level exception handling mechanism.
Performing an expensive check on every memory access
could result in large performance overheads, so Section 4
describes the techniques we use to avoid expensive va-
lidity checks by reorganizing the identifier metadata and
employing hardware caching.
3.3 In-Memory Pointer Metadata
As pointers can be resident in memory, the identifier meta-
data also needs to be maintained with pointers in memory. To
maintain memory layout compatibility, the hardware main-
tains the per-pointer metadata in the shadow memory. Con-
ceptually, every word in memory has identifier metadata in
the shadow memory. When a pointer is read from memory,
the metadata associated with the pointer being read is also
read from the shadow memory. To implement this behav-
ior (see Figure 2a), for every load instruction the Watchdog
hardware injects (1) a check µop to perform the check, (2)
a µop to perform the load of the actual value into the register
and (3) a shadow_load µop to load the identifier (ID) meta-
data from the shadow memory space. Stores are handled
analogously (also shown in Figure 2b). We assume pointers
are word aligned (as is required by some ISAs and is gener-
ally true with modern compilers even for x86), which allows
the the shadow load/store µops to accesses the shadow space
via an aligned load/store in a single cache access.
The shadow space is placed in a dedicated region of the
virtual address space that mirrors the normal data space.
Placing the shadow space into the program’s virtual address
space allows shadow accesses to be handled as normal mem-
ory accesses using the usual address translation and page al-
location mechanisms of the operating system. Current 64-bit
x86 systems support 48-bit virtual addresses, so the the hard-
ware uses a few high-order bits from the available virtual ad-
dress space to position the shadow space. This organization
allows the shadow load/shadow store µop to convert an ad-
dress to a shadowspace address via simple bit selection and
concatenation.
Accessing the shadow space on every memory operation
would result in significant performance penalties, so Sec-
tion 5 describes the mechanisms we use to reduce the num-
ber of metadata accesses by inserting metadata load/store
µops only for those memory operations that might actually
load or store pointer values.
3.4 In-Register Metadata
To ensure that the checks inserted before a memory access
have the correct identifier metadata, the identifiers must be
propagated with all pointer operations acting on values in
registers (pointer copies and pointer arithmetic). For exam-
ple, when an offset is added or subtracted from a pointer,
the destination register inherits the identifier of the origi-
nal pointer. Figure 2 shows the identifier propagation with
addition operations as a result of pointer arithmetic. Such
register manipulation instructions are extremely common, so
copying the metadata on each operation (say, via an inserted
µop) would be extremely costly. Instead, Section 6 describes
Watchdog’s use of copy elimination via register renaming to
reduce the number of propagation µops inserted.
3.5 Watchdog Usage Model
Watchdog would likely first be deployed on an opt-in basis
similar to the deployment scenario with Microsoft’s page-
based no-execute Data Execution Prevention (DEP) feature.
Initially, DEP was not enabled by default as it can break
some programs that use self-modifying code or JIT-based
code generation. Similarly, Watchdog would not be enabled
for programs that might violate Watchdog’s assumptions un-
til after developers have explicitly tested their code with it.
Like DEP, which is now enabled by default for most new
software, we anticipate similar adoption for Watchdog.
This section has described the basic approach and has
outlined three implementation optimizations to make it effi-
cient: implementing efficient checks, identifying pointer ac-
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p = malloc(size)
(a) Heap allocation
(runtime)
 
 key = unique_identifier++;
 lock = allocate_new_lock();
 *(lock) = key;
 id = (key, lock); 
 q = setident(p, id);
free(p)
 id = getident(p);
 *(id.lock) = INVALID;
 add_to_free_list(id.lock)
call 
 stack_key = stack_key + 1
 stack_lock = stack_lock + 8 
 memory[stack_lock] = stack_key
 %rsp.id  = (stack_key, stack_lock)
(c) Stack allocation
(hardware)
(b) Heap deallocation
(runtime)
return
 memory[stack_lock] = INVALID
 stack_lock = stack_lock - 8
 current_key = memory[stack_lock]
 %rsp.id = (current_key, stack_lock)
(d) Stack deallocation
(hardware)
Figure 3. Identifier (id) allocation and deallocation with malloc/free and call/return
cesses, and register renaming techniques to avoid unneces-
sary µops. The next three sections describe these design op-
timizations, respectively.
4. Efficient Use-After-Free Checking
Watchdog performs a check as part of every load and store.
Memory operations are common, so this operation must be
lightweight to achieve low performance overheads. This sec-
tion describes: (1) the engineering of the identifiers to make
lookups cheap and (2) using a hardware cache to further ac-
celerate these checks.
4.1 “Lock and Key” Lookups
To accelerate checks, Watchdog uses a hardware implemen-
tation of the lock and key checking approach previously used
by some software-only checkers [23, 29, 35]. The lock and
key identifier technique transforms a validity check into just
a load and comparison by splitting the identifier into two
sub-components: a key (a 64-bit unsigned integer) and a
lock (a 64-bit address which points to a location in mem-
ory). The memory location pointed to by the lock is called
the lock location. The system maintains the invariant that if
the identifier is valid, the value contained in the lock loca-
tion is equal to the key’s value. With a lock and key iden-
tifier, a check is a single memory access plus an equality
comparison. This check works because: (1) the key is writ-
ten into the lock location at allocation time, (2) the contents
of the lock location is changed upon deallocation, and (3)
keys are unique and thus no subsequent allocation will ever
reset the lock location to value that would cause a spurious
match (even if the underlying memory or the lock locations
are subsequently reused).
Memory allocation/deallocation occurs when (1) the run-
time performs such operations on the heap and (2) new stack
frames are created/deleted on function entry and exits. Cor-
respondingly, Watchdog allocates/deallocates identifiers on
these operations. Heap allocation is fairly uncommon com-
pared to function calls, so Watchdog relies on the runtime
software to perform identifier management for the heap.
In contrast, the Watchdog hardware performs the identifier
management for function calls/returns.
On each heap memory allocation, the software runtime
allocates both a unique 64-bit key and a new lock location
from a list of free locations, and the runtime writes the key
value into the lock location. The runtime conveys the iden-
tifier to the hardware using the setident instruction that
takes two register inputs: (1) a pointer to the start of the
memory being allocated and (2) the unique lock and key
identifier (128-bit) being assigned as shown in Figure 3a.
On memory deallocations, the runtime obtains the identifier
associated with the pointer being freed using the getident
instruction that takes the pointer being freed as the regis-
ter input as shown in Figure 3b. The runtime then uses the
identifier metadata to write an INVALID value to the lock lo-
cation. The runtime then returns the lock location to the free
list. To prevent double-frees and calling free() on memory
not allocated with malloc(), the runtime also checks that
the pointer’s identifier is valid as part of the free() opera-
tion.
To perform identifier management for stack frames on
calls and returns, the hardware injects µops to maintain an in-
memory stack of lock locations whose top of stack is stored
in a new stack_lock control register. The next key to be
allocated is maintained with a separate stack_key control
register. On a function call, the hardware injects four µops to:
allocate a new key, push that key onto the in-memory lock
location stack, and associate the new key and lock location
with the stack pointer (see Figure 3c). On function return,
the identifier associated with the stack pointer is restored
to the identifier of the current stack frame. This operation
is accomplished by reading the value of the key from the
memory location pointed by the stack lock register after the
stack manipulation (also 4 µops, as shown in Figure 3d).
Figure 4a illustrates the lock and key identifier scheme
where two pointers p and q point to the different parts of the
same object. Hence both p and q have the same ID in shadow
memory with key being 5 and lock being address 0xB0. The
lock location at address 0xB0 pointed by the lock part of the
ID also has 5 as the key indicating that the object pointed by
the pointers p and q are still allocated and valid.
Watchdog inserts a check µop before each memory ac-
cess. This single µop reads the metadata from a register
(which contains both the lock and key), loads the value cur-
rently at the lock location, and then compares it to the key.
If the value loaded does not match the key, the memory as-
sociated with this pointer was previously deallocated, thus
the access is invalid and the hardware raises an exception.
Figure 4b illustrates the validity check that consists of a sin-
gle memory access plus an equality comparison rather than
some more expensive hash table or tree lookup operation.
5
0xB0p:0x50 5
0xB0q:0x70 5
per pointer idptrs
5   lock
locations
0xB0
Key Lock
0x50
0x70
a Lock and key identifier
load R1 <- memory[R2]  
or
store memory[R2] <- R1
 
 if (R2.id.key != memory[R2.id.lock]) 
     then dangling ptr exception 
b Watchdog check
L2 Cache
L3 Cache/Memory
Data 
Cache
Lock 
location 
cache
Core
TLB Instruc
tion 
Cache
TLB TLB
c Lock location cache
Figure 4. (a) Watchdog’s lock and key identifier. Here two pointers p and q point to different part of the same object and hence
have the same identifier. (b) the placement of the lock location cache (shaded). (c) Watchdog check before a load and store is a
memory access and a equality comparison with lock and key identifier.
4.2 Lock Location Cache
Even with this efficient validity check, each check µop still
performs a memory access, which increases the demand
placed on the cache ports. To mitigate this impact, Watch-
dog optionally adds a lock location cache to the core, which
is accessed by the check µop and is dedicated exclusively
for lock locations. Just as splitting the instruction and data
caches increases the effective cache bandwidth (by sepa-
rating instruction fetches from loads/stores), this additional
cache is used to provide more bandwidth for accessing lock
locations. This cache becomes a peer with the instruction
and data caches (as shown in Figure 4c), has its own (small)
TLB, and uses the same tagging, block size, and state bits
used to maintain coherence among the caches. Memory al-
locations and deallocations update lock location values, so
these operations also access the lock location cache. Even
a small lock location cache (e.g., 4KB) can be effective be-
cause (1) lock locations (8 bytes per object currently allo-
cated) are small relative to the average object size and (2) the
lock locations region has little fragmentation and exhibits
reasonable spatial locality because lock locations are reallo-
cated using a LIFO free list. Cache misses are handled just
like misses in the data cache.
5. Identifying Pointer Load/Store Operations
Watchdog conceptually maintains a lock and key identifier
with every pointer in a register or memory. However, bina-
ries for standard ISAs do not provide explicit information
about which operations manipulate pointers. In the absence
of such information, propagating metadata with every regis-
ter and memory operation would require many extra memory
operations, resulting in substantial performance degradation.
This section describes two techniques for identifying pointer
operations, the results of which can be used to reduce the
number of accesses to the metadata space.
5.1 Conservative Pointer Identification
To enable Watchdog to work with reasonable overhead with-
out significant changes to program binaries, we observe that,
for current ISAs and compilers, pointers are generally word-
sized, aligned, and resident in integer registers. Based on this
observation, Watchdog conservatively assumes that only a
64-bit load/store to an integer register may be a pointer oper-
ation, whereas floating point load/stores and sub-word mem-
ory accesses are non-pointer operations. Watchdog does not
insert additional metadata manipulation µops for such non-
pointer operations.1 As evidence of the effectiveness of this
heuristic, the left bars in Figure 5 show that this approach
classifies 31% of memory operations as potentially load-
ing/storing a pointer.
5.2 ISA-Assisted Pointer Identification
Although the above conservative heuristic is effective, we
also explore more precise identification by extending the
ISA with load and store variants that indicate whether a
pointer is being loaded or stored. Using these annotations,
the compiler, which generally knows which operations are
manipulating pointers, is responsible for conservatively
selecting the proper load/store variants. To experimentally
study the potential benefits of this approach without per-
forming significant modifications to a compiler backend, we
used a profiling pass to determine which static instructions
ever load or store valid pointer metadata. The profiling
pass monitored every access to the metadata space and
identified those static instructions that ever loaded valid
metadata. For subsequent runs, we considered these static
memory operations as having been marked by the compiler
as load/stores of pointers.2 The right bar of each benchmark
in Figure 5 shows that this approach reduces the number
of memory accesses classified as pointer operations to just
18% on average.
1One potentially problematic case is the manipulation of pointers
using byte-by-byte copies (e.g. memcpy()). We found that com-
pilers for x86 typically use word-granularity operations. In other
cases, we have modified the standard library as needed.
2 Although we see this approximation as primarily an experimental
aide, such an approach might actually be useful for instrumenting
libraries or other code that cannot be recompiled.
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Figure 5. Percentage of memory accesses metadata for conservative and ISA-assisted identification.
6. Decoupled Register Metadata
As described thus far, Watchdog explicitly copies metadata
along with each arithmetic operation in registers. This sec-
tion briefly discusses and discards the straightforward ap-
proach of widening each register with additional metadata.
Although such a design might be appropriate for an in-
order processor core, our Watchdog implementation targets
out-of-order dynamically scheduled cores. Thus, this sec-
tion: (1) describes a decoupled metadata implementation of
Watchdog in which the data and metadata are mapped to dif-
ferent physical registers within the core, (2) discusses what
µops would be inserted to maintain the decoupled register
metadata, and (3) shows how metadata propagation over-
heads can be reduced via previously-proposed copy elimi-
nation modifications to the register renaming logic.
6.1 Strawman: Monolithic Register Data/Metadata
As presented in Section 3, Watchdog views each register
as being widened with a sidecar to contain identifier meta-
data. Although that design is conceptually straightforward—
especially for an in-order core—it suffers from inefficien-
cies. First, every register write (and most register reads) must
access the sidecar metadata, increasing the number of bits
read and written to the register file; although not neces-
sarily a performance problem, this could be a energy con-
cern. Second, a more subtle issue is that treating register
data/metadata as monolithic causes operations that write just
the data or metadata to become partial register writes. These
partial register accesses introduce unnecessary dependencies
between µops, for example, the load µop and the metadata
load µop. These serializations can have several detrimental
effects, including (1) increasing the load-to-use penalty of
pointer loads, (2) stalling subsequent instructions if either of
the loads miss in the cache, and (3) limiting the memory-
level parallelism by serializing the load and the metadata
load. In our initial experiments with various implementa-
tions of monolithic registers, we found the performance im-
pact of such serializations to be significant.
6.2 Decoupled Register Data/Metadata
To address these performance issues, Watchdog decouples
the register metadata by maintaining the data and metadata
in separate physical registers. Each architectural register is
mapped to two physical registers: one for data and one for
the metadata. With this change, individual µops generally
operate on either the data or the metadata, removing the seri-
alization caused by partial register writes of monolithic reg-
isters. Once decoupled, the metadata propagation and check-
ing is almost entirely removed from the critical path of the
program’s dataflow graph.
With decoupled metadata, there are multiple cases for
which register metadata must be propagated or updated.
First, instructions such as adding an immediate value to a
register simply copy the metadata from the input register to
the output register. Second, some instructions never gener-
ate valid pointers (e.g., the output of a sub-word operation
or a divide is not a valid pointer), thus such instructions al-
ways set the metadata of the output register to be invalid.
Third, either of the registers might be a pointer, so for such
instructions Watchdog inserts a select µop, which selects
the metadata from whichever register has valid metadata.3
Watchdog performs metadata propagation by changing
the register renaming to reduce the number of extra µops in-
serted. In only one of these three cases described above does
Watchdog actually insert µops; in the other cases (copying
the metadata or setting it to invalid), Watchdog uses previ-
ously proposed modifications to register renaming logic [18,
30] to handle these operations completely in the register re-
name stage. Watchdog extends the maptable to maintain two
mappings for each logical register: the regular mapping and
a metadata mapping. Instructions that unambiguously copy
the metadata (such as “add immediate”, which has a single
register input) update the metadata mapping of the destina-
tion register in the maptable with the metadata mapping en-
try of the input register. This implementation eliminates the
register copies by physical register sharing, as there is a sin-
gle copy of the metadata in a physical register [30]. To en-
sure that this physical register is not freed until all the map-
pings in the maptable are overwritten, these physical regis-
ters need to be reference counted. We adopt previously pro-
posed techniques to efficiently implement reference counted
physical registers [33]. Figure 6 shows how decoupled meta-
data avoids copy µops while avoiding the introduction of un-
necessary dependencies between µops.
3 If the ISA was further extended to allow the compiler to annotate
such instructions, these select µops could also be eliminated.
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A:
B: 
C: ld r1 <- memory[r2]
D: add r3<- r1, 4
E: 
F: 
G: st memory[r2] <- r3
Program with 
Watchdog uops Map-Table
   
   
 ld p4 <- memory[p2]
 add p5<- p4, 4
 st memory[p2] <- p5
r1:(p1, -),r2:(p2,p6),r3:(p3, -)
r1:(p1,p7),r2:(p2,p6),r3:(p3, -)
r1:(p4,p7),r2:(p2,p6),r3:(p3, -)
r1:(p4,p7),r2:(p2,p6),r3:(p5,p7)
r1:(p4,p7),r2:(p2,p6),r3:(p5,p7)
r1:(p4,p7),r2:(p2,p6),r3:(p5,p7)
r1:(p4,p7),r2:(p2,p6),r3:(p5,p7)
Renamed 
Instructions
  check r2.id
 ld r1.id  <-  shadow[r2.val]
 check r2.id
 st shadow[r2.val]  <-  r3.id
  check p6
  ld p7  <-  shadow[p2]
  check p6
  st shadow[p2]  <-  p7
Figure 6. Example illustrating register renaming with Watchdog µops and extensions to the map table. Watchdog inserted
µops are shaded. The map table is represented by a tuple for each register. r:(a,b) means logical register r maps to physical
register a according to the regular map table mapping and the logical register r maps to a 128-bit physical register b according
to the Watchdog mapping. Watchdog introduced load and store µops access the shadow memory (shadow) for accessing the
metadata. The watchdog mapping of − indicates the invalid mapping (the register currently contains a non-pointer value).
7. Implementation Considerations
Custom memory allocation. For programs that use custom
memory allocators (e.g., by requesting a region of memory
which it then partitions), by default Watchdog will check the
allocation status of the entire region of memory. However, if
the the programmer instruments the custom memory alloca-
tor, Watchdog will then be able to perform exact checking
for these allocators.
Global variables and initialization. Global variables are
never deallocated, so all pointers to globals (data segment)
are given the same single global identifier, which ensures
that the validity check always passes. One way to obtain
the address of a global variable is by PC-relative addressing
modes. Watchdog handles this case by associating the global
identifier with any address generated by PC-relative address-
ing modes. A related issue is initializing the metadata space
for the global variables. C programs are allowed to initial-
ize non-null pointers in the global space by initializing such
pointers to point to other objects in the global space. To prop-
erly set the metadata to support initialized global pointers,
Watchdog also initializes the entire metadata shadow space
for the global data segment with the global identifier.
Multithreading. Although we do not evaluate Watchdog
in the context of multithreaded programs, Watchdog would
ideally seamlessly support multithreaded workloads (an is-
sue not typically addressed by existing software-only ap-
proaches). As with software-only approaches, if operations
on pointers occur non-atomically, interleaved execution and
data races (either unintentional races or intentional races
used in lock-free concurrent data structures) can cause er-
rors. Watchdog will work seamlessly with multithreaded
workloads if its implementation ensures: (1) the runtime has
a thread-safe way to allocate unique identifiers (easily han-
dled with a thread-local variable and partitioning the space
of identifiers), (2) pointer load and store’s data and metadata
accesses execute atomically, and (3) the check and mem-
ory operation occur atomically. Such atomicity could be pro-
vided by supporting a two-location atomic update operation
in hardware. Alternatively, if we consider only lock-based
data-race free programs, #2 above is not necessary and re-
quirement #3 above can be relaxed if the check is moved to
after the memory access and the system can tolerate a single
invalid access before the exception is raised.
8. Integrating Bounds Checking
Although the focus of this paper is on use-after-free vio-
lations, Watchdog’s overall approach and implementation
was explicitly designed to mesh well with pointer-based
bounds checking [3, 9, 15, 22, 24, 29, 35], which track
base and bound metadata with pointers for precise byte-
granularity bounds checking of all memory accesses. The
metadata propagation and checking machinery proposed in
this paper can be extended to provide efficient bounds check-
ing — and thus hardware-enforced full memory safety.
To implement a fully hardware-enforced pointer-based
memory bounds checker [9], we extend the Watchdog hard-
ware in three ways. First, we extend the in-memory and reg-
ister metadata with 64-bit base and 64-bit bound metadata
(for a total of 256 bits of metadata per pointer). Second,
we correspondingly widened the memory access µops in-
jected for accessing in-memory metadata. Third, we extend
checking to perform a range check based on the metadata
by either: (1) injecting a new additional bounds check µop
for each memory operation or (2) by extending the current
check µop to perform both checks in parallel with one µop.
As the bounds check consists of just two inequality com-
parisons (and requires no additional memory accesses), ei-
ther implementation is likely feasible. We evaluate both al-
ternatives. Note that Watchdog’s mechanisms such as µop
injection for metadata propagation/checking, pointer identi-
fication, decoupled side-car registers, and copy elimination
using register renaming techniques all apply directly, which
highlights that the utility of such techniques extends beyond
just use-after-free checking.
To enforce bounds precisely, the hardware relies on byte-
granularity bounds information provided by the compiler
and/or runtime whenever a pointer is created [9]. For heap
allocated objects, the malloc runtime library can convey
such bounds information. For pointers to a stack-allocated
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Table 2. Simulated processor configurations
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Figure 7. Runtime overhead with conservative and ISA-assisted pointer identification
or global object, precise checking requires the compiler to
insert instructions to convey bounds information at pointer
creation points. In the absence of such exact information,
the hardware can still perform bounds checking — just less
precisely — by restricting the bounds of pointers pointing to
stack variables and globals to the range of the current stack
frame and the global segment, respectively.
9. Experiments
This section provides an experimental evaluation of Watch-
dog and highlights: (1) its effectiveness in preventing secu-
rity exploits, (2) its low performance overheads, and (3) its
synergistic integration with bounds checking to provide full
hardware-enforced memory safety.
9.1 Methodology
We used an x86-64 simulator that executes the user-level
portions of statically linked 64-bit x86 programs. The
simulator decodes x86 macro instructions and cracks
them into a RISC-style µops. The out-of-order processor
parameters (see Table 2) were selected to be similar to
Intel’s Core i7 “Sandy Bridge” processor. We modified
the standard DL-malloc memory allocator to use the new
instruction to inform the hardware of memory allocations
and deallocations. We used twenty C SPEC benchmarks,
including an enhanced version of the equake benchmark
that uses a proper multidimensional array and thus improves
its baseline performance by 60%. We compiled the bench-
marks using the GNU C compiler version 4.4 using standard
optimization flags. We generally used the reference inputs,
but used train/test inputs in some cases to ensure reasonable
simulation times. We used 2% periodic sampling with
each sample of 10 million instructions proceeded by a fast
forward and a warmup of 480 and 10 million instructions
per period, respectively.
9.2 Efficacy in Preventing Security Vulnerabilities
To evaluate the effectiveness of Watchdog in preventing use-
after-free security exploits, we ran the 291 test cases for use-
after-free vulnerabilities (CWE-416 and CWE-562) from the
NIST Juliet Test Suite for C/C++ [27], which are modeled
after various use-after-free errors reported in the wild. It suc-
cessfully detected and thwarted the attack in all the 291 test
cases, and it did so without any false positives.
9.3 Runtime Overheads of Use-after-Free Checking
Figure 7 presents the percentage execution time overhead of
Watchdog over a baseline without any Watchdog instrumen-
tation (smaller bars are better as they represent lower run-
time overheads). The graphs contains a pair of bars for each
benchmark. The height of the left and right bars represent
the overhead of Watchdog with conservative pointer iden-
tification (25% on average) and ISA-assisted pointer iden-
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Figure 8. µop overhead
tification (15% on average), respectively. More than half
of the benchmarks have runtime overheads less than 5%
with ISA-assisted pointer identification. These runtime are
substantially lower than the 50-133% overhead reported by
related software-only schemes [23, 35]. More importantly,
these overheads are likely low enough for use in production
systems — critical for preventing security vulnerabilities —
rather than just for debugging.
Watchdog performs its functionality by inserting µops,
so the total number of µops inserted is instructive in under-
standing the sources of execution time overheads. Figure 8
presents the µop overhead when employing ISA-assisted
pointer identification. The total height of the each bar rep-
resents the total µop overhead for the benchmark and each
bar is divided into four segments: (1) checks, (2) pointer
loads, (3) pointer stores, and (4) the µops to perform mem-
ory allocation/deallocation and identifier propagation in reg-
isters. On average, Watchdog executes 44% more µops than
the baseline. The execution time overhead is lower than the
µop overhead because these µops are off the critical path and
thus execute in parallel as part of superscalar execution. The
check µops account for bulk of the µop overhead (29% on
average). Pointer metadata load and store µops account for
4% and 2% of the extra µops on an average but can be as
high as 14% and 8%, respectively. The µop overhead due to
propagation µops and memory allocation/deallocation oper-
ations (on the heap and the stack) account for the remaining
µops (9% on average).
One potential source of performance overhead is the ad-
ditional cache pressure due to the per-pointer shadowspace
metadata. To isolate this effect, we performed a set of sim-
ulations configured to idealize the shadow memory accesses
(metadata accesses occupy cache ports but never cache miss
and to not actually consume space in the data cache). Mak-
ing the metadata free of cache effects in this way changed
the runtime overhead by only 4% on average (decrease from
15% to 11%), indicating that cache pressure effects are gen-
erally not dominant in these benchmarks.
To decrease contention on limited cache ports, the re-
sults presented thus far include a 4KB lock location cache
(Section 4.2). Figure 9 reports the execution time overhead
without this cache, in which all check operations use the
limited data load ports. Without the lock location cache,
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Figure 9. Performance with lock location cache
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Figure 10. Memory overhead with words and pages
the overhead of Watchdog increases to 24% on average (up
from 15%). The improvements are especially significant for
benchmarks such as hmmer and h264, as these benchmarks
already have high IPC and frequent memory accesses, both
of which lead to significant contention for the data cache
load ports in the absence of a lock location cache. These re-
sults are not particularly sensitive to the exact size of the
lock location cache; for a 4KB cache, the miss rate is less
than 1 miss per 1000 instructions for seventeen of the twenty
benchmarks.
Figure 10 presents the memory overheads with ISA-
assisted pointer identification over a baseline without
any instrumentation. The memory overhead is negligible
for the majority of the benchmarks. However, several of
the benchmarks approach worst-case overheads of two
shadow pages for each non-shadow page. The memory
overhead is calculated in two ways: total words of memory
accessed (left bar) and total 4KB pages of memory accessed
(right bar), which reflects on-demand allocation of shadow
space pages by the operating system. On an average, the
memory overhead calculated these two ways is 32% and
56%, respectively. The difference in these metrics reflect
the impact of fragmentation caused by page-granularity
allocation of the shadow space. These memory overheads
compare favorably to the overheads reported for garbage
collection [14] or prior best-effort approaches for mitigating
use-after-free errors such as heap randomization [20] and
object-per-page approaches [10].
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Figure 11. Runtime overhead with bounds checking with one or two check µops
9.4 Integrating Bounds Checking
Beyond use-after-free checking, Section 8 described how
the proposed hardware can be extended to also perform
bounds checking, thus enforcing full memory safety.
Figure 11 presents the execution time overhead with ISA-
assisted pointer identification for Watchdog extended to
perform bounds checking by either injecting: (1) a single
check µop (which performs both the bound and identifier
checking) or (2) a pair of µops (one µop each for bounds
and identifier checking). When implemented as a single
µop, the overall number of µops is unchanged and results in
only a 3% increase in execution time overhead (from 15%
to 18%), primarily due to the cache pressure introduced by
the larger in-memory metadata. When the bound check is
implemented as an additional µop injection, the overhead
increases by 6% to a total average overhead over the
unmodified baseline of 24% for complete memory safety.
10. Related Work
Garbage collection (GC) is an alternative approach to elim-
inating dangling pointers for application domains where
garbage collection is suitable. When combined with “heapi-
fication” [24] of escaping stack objects, garbage collection
can eliminate all dangling pointers. Further, hardware
support to either perform GC completely in hardware [21]
or to flexibly accelerate GC have been proposed [16] to
reduce the overheads. An alternative approach for enforcing
safe manual memory management (at the cost of some
modifications to the program source code) is to assert that
an object’s reference count is zero at deallocation time [12].
Several other approaches have been used to mitigate use-
after-free errors. Probabilistic approaches [19, 28] use a ran-
domized memory manager to allocate objects randomly on
the heap and recycle the memory randomly, thereby mak-
ing it difficult to exploit the errors. These techniques can
leverage virtual address translation mechanism to detect er-
rors without inserting any checking code. The open-source
tools Electric Fence, PageHeap, and DUMA allocate each
object on a different physical and virtual page. Upon deal-
location, the access permission on individual virtual pages
are disabled, increasing memory usage and causing high
runtime overheads for allocation-intensive programs [10].
These schemes allocate one object per virtual and physi-
cal page, resulting in large memory overheads for programs
with many small objects. This overhead can be partly miti-
gated by placing multiple objects per physical page but map-
ping a different virtual page for each object to the shared
page [10, 20].
11. Conclusion
This paper described Watchdog, a hardware approach
for safe and secure manual memory management via
low-overhead, comprehensive use-after-free checking with
disjoint metadata. To efficiently implement Watchdog,
we used ideas from existing software-only approaches,
explored ISA support for explicitly identifying pointer
operations, described efficient decoupled register metadata
via register renaming copy elimination, and utilized a lock
location cache to accelerate checks. The resulting overhead
is likely low enough to use in production (and not just
debugging). Furthermore, we extended the mechanisms to
perform bounds checking. The resulting system ensures full
memory safety and provides comprehensive protection from
use-after-free and buffer overflow vulnerabilities for a 24%
performance penalty.
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